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INTRODUCTION
Although Caucasian males constitute a minority of the total and,
likewise, college-educated workforce, they dominate the upper echelons of
virtually every job sector. Males comprise 85.7% of executive officership
positions and 82% of directorship positions at Fortune 500 companies.1
Men hold over 90% of leadership positions in the news media and over
90% of all reporters are white.2 Caucasian men constitute over 86% of
partnership positions in major law firms. They hold 85% of tenured

1. Updated Datasheet: Alliance for Board Diversity Report, ALLIANCE FOR
BOARD DIVERSITY (July 21, 2011), available at http://Theabd.Org/Abd_Datasheet.pdf;
Women Executive Officers in the Fortune 500, CATALYST (Last updated Dec. 14,
2011), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-executive-officers-fortune-500.
2. Id.
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college professorships3 and occupy over 80% of managerial positions in
advertising, marketing, and public relations.4 In 1992, in the midst of the
Supreme Court’s dismantling of state and federal affirmative action
programs, the median weekly earnings of white males were 33% higher
than those of any group in America.5
Despite significant factual evidence of continued inequality in various
employment fields, the last fifteen years have witnessed a remarkable
decline in the use of gender-based affirmative action.6 The decision to
abandon such programs has been spurred in large part by the Supreme
Court’s decision to apply strict scrutiny to all federal and state race-based
affirmative action programs in the employment context regardless of
existing racial disparity.7 While the Court’s jurisprudence has been
confined to race-based programs, lower courts have expanded the
approach, without basis in precedent, to gender-based programs. Spurred
in large part by the Supreme Court’s decision in Richmond v. Croson,8
federal appeals courts have developed a tripartite split over the appropriate
level of scrutiny for gender-based affirmative action programs. In addition
to the majority of lower courts that have split between strict scrutiny and
intermediate scrutiny, a minority of courts have developed a third approach
which, while calling itself intermediate scrutiny, requires a factual
predicate demonstrating a history of discrimination on par with that
required under strict scrutiny.9 The attack on intermediate scrutiny and,
accordingly, gender-based affirmative action, has been buttressed by a
subtle theoretical critique of the effectiveness of the standard to guard
against discriminatory statutes. The result of this regression has not only
been confusion among courts, but an abandonment of gender-based
affirmative action programs as various municipalities have chosen to avoid
subjecting their programs to sure defeat under strict scrutiny review.10
This paper will serve the dual purposes of defending intermediate
scrutiny as the appropriate standard under the Court’s jurisprudence and
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Patricia Ireland, President, National Organization of Women, Keynote Address
at the Florida National Organization of Women Conference (January 15, 2000)
(transcript on file with the National Organization for Women) [hereinafter Ireland,
Keynote Address].
7. Id.
8. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
9. See, e.g., Danskine v. Metro Dade Cnty. Fire Dep’t, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 125657 (S.D. Fla. 1999) aff’d sub nom. Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Dep’t, 253 F.3d 1288
(11th Cir. 2001).
10. See Ireland Keynote Address, supra note 6.
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answering some of the theoretical criticisms of the effectiveness of
intermediate scrutiny as a means to protect women from discriminatory
statutes. The first half of the paper will survey the progression of the
Court’s jurisprudence with regards to statutes that differentiate on the basis
of gender, focusing specifically on: (a) the development of the Supreme
Court’s gender-based equal protection jurisprudence;11 (b) the Supreme
Court’s decision in Richmond v. Croson, which dramatically altered the
approaches of a number of lower courts toward gender-based affirmative
action;12 and (c) the struggles of lower courts to determine the appropriate
standard of review for gender-based affirmative action programs postCroson, including influential jurisprudence involving racially differential
statutes.13 The second half of the paper will present a legal and theoretical
defense of intermediate scrutiny as the proper standard of review for
gender-based affirmative action programs including: (a) the fallacies
inherent in lower court decisions applying increased scrutiny based on the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence pre and post-Croson,14 and (b) responses to
theoretical criticisms of intermediate scrutiny, including the presentation of
alternatives to strict scrutiny which, while they may not conclusively
answer all criticisms, will provide a sound basis from which to defend the
legitimacy of the approach.15
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF GENDER-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND DECLINE OF INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY
Although the Supreme Court has never specifically addressed a case
involving a challenge to a gender-based affirmative action employment
program under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court’s and, likewise, lower courts’ jurisprudence is rich with decisions
upon which to formulate the appropriate standard were such a decision to
reach the Court.16 However, because the issue has never been addressed
specifically, a comprehensive review of the Court’s treatment of genderbased classifications and, likewise, affirmative action programs, is
necessary. The court’s jurisprudence regarding these areas can be divided
into the two general periods: (a) a time of development, during which the
Court formulated much of its equal protection jurisprudence, dealing
11. See infra Part I.A and accompanying notes.
12. See infra Part I.B and accompanying notes.
13. See infra Part I.C and accompanying notes.
14. See infra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
15. See infra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
16. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-26 (1982);
Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390, 403-04 (6th Cir. 1993).
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skeptically with statutes that discriminated on the basis of gender but
favorably towards those with a remedial purpose; and (b) a time of
retrenchment, during which the Court and lower courts, while remaining
vigilant with regards to statutes that discriminated on the basis of gender,
have demonstrated increased hostility towards remedial programs.
Sandwiched between the periods was the Supreme Court’s seminal
decision in Richmond v. Croson. While Croson dealt with a racially based
program, the decision has served as the basis for increased attacks, both
legal and theoretical, on the use of intermediate scrutiny for affirmative
action in the gender context by several lower courts.
A. The Rise of Intermediate Scrutiny: The Development of the Court’s
Jurisprudence with Regard to Statutes That Differentiate on the Basis of
Gender
For nearly a century after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification,
statutes that differentiated on the basis of gender were readily approved
under the Supreme Court’s most cursory level of review—rational basis
scrutiny. Beginning with Reed v. Reed,17 the Supreme Court began to
develop a more rigid standard for such statutes. However, the crafting of a
definition of intermediate scrutiny proved rather difficult. First, in large
part influenced by the Equal Rights Amendment, the Supreme Court
fluctuated as to whether strict scrutiny should be applied to statutes that
differentiated on the basis of gender. Second, in addition to statutes that
specifically created barriers for females, the Supreme Court expressed
special concern about statutes that, while appearing to benefit women, in
fact did the opposite by reinforcing superficial stereotypes about their
functions in society. Third, because of what it saw as accepted biological
differences between men and women, the Supreme Court developed a
“biological differences” jurisprudence under which statutes that
differentiated on the basis of gender would, on rare occasion, be
approved.18
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
the state not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.”19 Though broad in its proscription, the effect of the clause
remained rather limited in its effect for nearly a century after its
ratification. During this period, the Court regularly upheld statutes that not
only differentiated, but actively discriminated, on the basis of gender by

17. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 71 (1971) (finding discriminatory a statute that
favored men over women in determining the administrator of a decedent’s estate).
18. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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utilizing a test of “pure rational basis” scrutiny.20 If the state could
demonstrate any possible reason for enacting the statute, the Court would
uphold the statute.21
Beginning with Reed, the Supreme Court increasingly expressed
skepticism when examining such laws. Though the Court maintained that
rational basis remained the appropriate standard of review,22 the Court
struck down an Idaho statute preferring males over females when
calculating inheritance, finding the state’s interest in reducing the
judiciary’s workload insufficient to justify the statute.23
Within two years, the Court was again presented with a statute that
allegedly discriminated on the basis of gender. However, in this instance,
the statute’s effect on women was more nebulous. In Frontiero v.
Richardson,24 the statute at issue provided that “spouses of male members
of the uniformed services [were] dependents for purposes of obtaining
increased [severance and benefits], but that spouses of female members
[were] not dependents unless they [were] in fact dependent for over onehalf of their support.”25 The statute thereby created a presumption that
wives receive benefits upon their husband’s death, but required that
husbands surpass an additional evidentiary hurdle before receiving the
same benefits after their wives’ deaths. The Court framed the statute from
the perspective of the deceased female spouse, concluding that the statute
worked an invidious discrimination against female members of the military
and, accordingly, was unconstitutional under “strict judicial scrutiny.”26
In justifying its decision, the Court emphasized three significant points.
First, the Court explicitly distinguished the case from one in which a
remedial program on the basis of gender was at issue, stating explicitly:
It should be noted that these statutes are not in any sense designed to
rectify the effects of past discrimination against women. On the
contrary, these statutes seize upon a group—women—who have
historically suffered discrimination in employment, and rely on the
effects of this past discrimination as a justification for heaping on
additional economic disadvantages.27

20. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
21. See e.g., Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1999)
(defining this test as whether “the Legislature rationally could have believed Act 257
would substantially advance a legitimate purpose”).
22. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
23. Id. at 76-77.
24. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 688.
27. Id. at 689 n.22 (citations omitted).
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Second, in favor of its position, the state asserted merely administrative
convenience as the basis for its decision and presented no evidence in
support of its interest.28 This suggested to the Court that the statute, instead
of being passed upon sound reasoning and research, was in fact the product
of an archaic gender stereotype. Finally, while its decision that women
were now constitutionally a “suspect class” was based on precedent, its
decision to apply strict scrutiny was in large part influenced by
congressional passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)—which
explicitly guaranteed women equal treatment—and, secondarily, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act.29 Despite the belief then that the ERA would
receive sufficient approval, it subsequently failed to achieve the necessary
state support.30
In Craig v. Boren,31 the Court finally settled upon “intermediate
scrutiny” as the appropriate standard under which to review gender-based
classifications. As stated by the Court, for a statute that differentiates on
the basis of gender to be sustained, it “must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.”32 At issue in Craig was an Oklahoma statute that prohibited
males under the age of twenty-one and females under the age of eighteen
from purchasing beer with an alcoholic content of 3.2%.33 Though the
Court accepted the state’s interest in “public health and safety,”34 it found
gender to “not be substantially related to the achievement of the statutory
objective.”35 The state showed that 2% of eighteen to twenty-year old men,
but only 0.18% of women of that age, were arrested for driving under the
influence.36 Although the Court did question the statistical evidence

28. Id. at 688-89 (noting that the Government’s argument rested on a contention
that reaching the threshold to prove that a husband was financially dependent on his
wife would not be worth the time and money).
29. Id. at 687 (explaining that the shift to strict scrutiny was based on Congress’s
intention of eliminating invidious classifications).
30. See Deborah Rhode, Equal Rights in Retrospect, 1 LAW AND INEQUALITY 1, 10
(1983) (discussing the reasons for the failure of the amendment).
31. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
32. Id. at 197 (asserting that such classifications must be based on intermediate
scrutiny).
33. Id. at 192 (explaining that this distinction could deny equal protection under the
law to males between the ages of 18-20 years).
34. Id. at 199-200 (finding a state’s interest in public health and safety to be an
important government objective).
35. Id. at 204 (explaining that the use of statistics alone was insufficient to uphold
the statute under an intermediate scrutiny analysis).
36. Id. at 201 (framing the arrest rates as a “weak answer” to the equal protection
question posed in the Court’s analysis).
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presented, its decision emphasized, above any statistical insufficiencies,37
the problematic nature of a law based on “social stereotypes.”38 “The
question,” as Justice Stevens’ concurrence explained, “[was] whether the
traffic safety justification put forward by the State [was] sufficient to make
an otherwise offensive classification acceptable.”39 While, the statute in
Craig invidiously discriminated against men, in subsequent cases, the
Court regularly applied the same standard to statutes that invidiously
discriminated against women.
Having determined that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate for all
gender classifications, the Court had yet to cement whether the test
mandated—substantially related to an important governmental interest—
had the same or a similar meaning when applied in varying circumstances.
How would the test affect a statute that, for instance, benefited females as
opposed to males? What if a law respected “real differences between the
genders” as opposed to archaic stereotypes? The Supreme Court spent
much of the next decade answering these questions.
Shortly after Craig, the Court was confronted with a series of cases in
which women were immediately benefited by the challenged statutory
scheme.
In addition to disadvantaging men, “benign gender
classifications” benefited women economically. However, the programs
differed from modern day affirmative action programs in two significant
ways. First, in contrast to the affirmative action programs at issue in this
paper, the statutes did not create whole scale remedial schemes aimed at
increasing female presence in an employment field, but rather merely
created a series of judicial presumptions upon the occasion of a death or
divorce.40 Second, because many of the statutes focused on the assets of a
deceased spouse, it was not clear whether women were benefited by the
challenged statute because the deceased female spouse received an
economic benefit, or were disadvantaged by the statute because it reduced
the value of the work of a female employee.41
37. While the Court did delve into the statistics presented, the Court cautioned
against the dangers of conducting statistical analyses: “It is unrealistic to expect either
members of the judiciary or state officials to be well versed in the rigors of
experimental or statistical technique. But this merely illustrates that proving broad
sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is
in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause.”
Id. at 204.
38. Id. at 203 n.14 (relaying the perception that young men are reckless and
irresponsible while similarly-aged women are “chivalrously escorted home” instead of
drinking and driving).
39. Id. at 213 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
40. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652-53 (1975).
41. See id. at 653 (framing the gender-based distinction as gratuitous because it
would only impact women who matched the basis of the statute specifically).
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Two decisions issued prior to Craig suggested the importance of the
specific factual nature of the case; in particular, whether the challenged law
was motivated by a desire to equalize women’s place in society or driven
by an archaic gender-based stereotype. In Kahn v. Shevin,42 the Court
upheld a Florida statute that granted widows an annual five hundred dollar
property tax exemption.43 Appellant, a widower, challenged the exemption
because the statute offered no analogous benefit to widowers.44 The Court,
however, rejected petitioner’s claim, and distinguished the case from Reed
as the state’s interest was more than mere “administrative convenience”:
“We deal here with a state tax law reasonably designed to further the state
policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for
which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden.”45 The Court
explicitly stated: “Whether from overt discrimination or from the
socialization process of a male-dominated culture, the job market is
inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid jobs.”46
In contrast, in Weinberger v. Weisenfeld,47 the Court held
unconstitutional a provision of the Social Security Act that granted
survivors’ benefits, based on the earnings of a deceased husband and father
covered by the Act, both to his widow and to the couple’s minor children in
her care, but that granted benefits based on the earnings of a covered
deceased wife and mother only to the minor children and not to the
widower.48 While the Court found the state’s interest in providing for the
female spouse “not entirely without empirical support,”49 it distinguished
Kahn:
[T]he mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an
automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual
purposes underlying a statutory scheme. Here, it is apparent both from
the statutory scheme itself and from the legislative history of 402 (g) that
Congress’ purpose in providing benefits to young widows with children
was not to provide an income to women who were, because of economic
discrimination, unable to provide for themselves. Rather, 402 (g), linked
as it is directly to responsibility for minor children, was intended to
permit women to elect not to work and to devote themselves to the care
42. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352 (1974).
43. Id. at 352 (noting that in 1885 Florida began providing property tax exemptions
to widows).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 355.
46. Id. at 353.
47. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
48. Id. at 637-39.
49. See id. at 645 (acknowledging that men were more likely than women to be the
primary supporters of their households).
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of children.50

In Califano v. Goldfarb,51 the Court affirmed the vitality of the KahnWeinberger distinction post-Craig. Relying heavily on Weinberger, the
Court held unconstitutional a provision of the Social Security Act under
which survivors’ benefits, based on the earnings of a deceased husband,
were payable to his widow regardless of dependency, but such benefits on
the basis of the earnings of a deceased wife covered by the Act were
payable to her widower only if he was receiving at least half of his support
from her at the time of her death.52 As opposed to overruling Kahn, the
Court explicitly distinguished it, reaffirming its holding.53 Relying on the
focus of the statutory scheme and the Act’s legislative history, the Court
reasoned that “differential treatment of nondependent widows and
widowers result[ed] not from a deliberate congressional intention to
remedy the arguably greater needs of the former, but rather from an
intention to aid the dependent spouses of deceased wage earners, coupled
with the presumption that wives are usually dependent.”54 The Court
emphasized that the latter was the type of archaic and overbroad
generalization it had eschewed in its past cases.55 In addition, the Court
added that, viewed from the earner’s perspective, the statute discriminated
against women workers.56
In Orr v. Orr,57 the Supreme Court struck down a similar statute under
which husbands, but not wives, were required to pay alimony upon
divorce.58 The Court acknowledged that “it could be argued that the
Alabama statutory scheme was designed to provide help for needy spouses,
using sex as a proxy for need, and to compensate women for past
discrimination during marriage, which assertedly had left them unprepared
to fend for themselves in the working world following divorce.”59
However, it found “these considerations would not justify [the] scheme,
because, under the Alabama statutes, individualized hearings at which the
50. Id. at 648 (emphasis added).
51. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
52. Id. at 201-02.
53. See id. at 209 n.8 (identifying the difference in the Kahn ruling as arising from
the Kahn statute’s sole purpose in redressing the societal disparate treatment of
women).
54. Id. at 216-17.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 209 (reasoning that because Social Security is designed for the
protection of entire the family, its gender-based distinction is illogical).
57. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
58. Id. at 270-71.
59. Id. at 269.
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parties relative financial circumstances [were] considered already
Accordingly, there was no reason to operate by
occur[ed].”60
generalization.61
In contrast, in Califano v. Webster,62 the Court affirmed the vitality of
Kahn, upholding a separate provision of the Social Security Act that had
the effect of granting higher monthly old age benefits to retired female
workers as compared to those received by similarly situated male
workers.63 The act provided that benefits were to be computed dependent
upon the average monthly wage of the worker during certain statutorily
defined “benefit computation years.”64 Rather than tying their earnings to
those of a male spouse or children, the statutory scheme simply permitted
women to exclude an additional three lower earning years than men.65
However, the Court soon made clear that its archaic and overbroad
generalization jurisprudence was not limited merely to statutes which
assumed a women’s financial dependency upon a male or her role as childbearer, but in fact also included statutes which relied upon assumptions
about the limited occupational capacity of females. In Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan,66 the Court held that a college practice of
preferring females for entrance into a nursing school, over equally qualified
males, violated the Equal Protection Clause.67 Though the Court again
required that the statute serve important governmental interests and the
means employed be substantially related to their accomplishment, it
characterized this combined burden as one requiring proof of an
“exceedingly persuasive justification.”68 Nevertheless, the Court found that
the statute failed both prongs of the aforementioned intermediate scrutiny
test.69 Though the state asserted an interest in remedying societal
discrimination against women, the Court recognized that women, rather
than being discriminated against in the field of nursing, were
overrepresented.70 Accordingly, the state failed to establish that the
60. Id. at 281.
61. Id. (arguing that because these proceedings so heavily impact compensation to
families, generalizations can be especially harmful).
62. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
63. Id. at 314-16.
64. Id. at 314.
65. Id. at 314-16.
66. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
67. Id. at 719, 733.
68. Id. at 724.
69. Id. at 731.
70. See id. at 729 (noting that in 1970, women represented more than 98% of total
nursing degrees earned nationwide).
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“alleged objective [was] the actual purpose underlying the discriminatory
classification,” as opposed to an archaic and overbroad generalization.71
Concurrently, the Supreme Court developed a third category for statutes
which did not “remedy past discrimination” or reflect “archaic and
overbroad generalizations,” but instead accounted for alleged “biological
differences” between the genders. Despite the term’s implication, the
differences recognized were not limited to merely those that were strictly
biological. In Rostker v. Goldberg,72 the Court upheld a statute requiring
men, but not women, to register for the draft.73 The court reasoned,
“women as a group, unlike men as a group, are not eligible for combat” and
that the “President expressed his intent to continue the current military
policy.”74 In Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court,75 the Court
upheld a statute defining statutory rape as “an act of sexual intercourse
accomplished with a female . . . under the age of eighteen years.”76 The
Court reasoned that while the risk of pregnancy served as a natural
deterrent to young females from sexual intercourse, which may ultimately
lead to teenage pregnancy, no similar deterrent existed for males.77
Accordingly, “a criminal sanction imposed solely on males thus served to
roughly equalize the deterrents on the sexes.”78
In drawing the contours of this category of cases, the Court drew an
especially tenuous line when characterizing statutes, which differentiated
on matters related to parent-child relationships. In Parham v. Hughes,79 the
Court upheld, against constitutional challenge, a Georgia statute permitting
the mother, but not the father, of a child born to non-married patents to sue
for the wrongful death of the child when the father had not formally
“legitimated” the child.80 However, in Caban v. Mohammed,81 the Court
struck down a statute that required the consent of the mother, but not the

71. Id. at 730.
72. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
73. Id. at 59, 83.
74. Id. at 76-77.
75. Michael M. v. Sonoma Cnty. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
76. Id. at 466, 481.
77. Id. at 473.
78. Id.
79. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
80. Id. at 348-49, 358. In the eyes of the Court, “the fact [was] that mothers and
fathers of illegitimate children are not similarly situated. Unlike the mother of an
illegitimate child whose identity will rarely be in doubt, the identity of the father will
frequently be unknown.” Id. at 355.
81. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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father, for the adoption of a child born out of wedlock.82
B. The First Step Backwards: The Supreme Court’s
Decision in Richmond v. Croson
While the Supreme Court was struggling to determine the proper
standard of review for statutes that differentiate on the basis of gender, it
was also developing its jurisprudence regarding statutes that differentiate
on the basis of race. The Supreme Court’s decision in Croson resolved two
conflicting lines of cases—those involving statutes that benefited
minorities and all other statutes that differentiated on the basis of race—
determining that regardless of intent, the statute would have to survive the
Supreme Court’s most rigid level of review: strict scrutiny.
1. The Court’s Pre-Croson Jurisprudence with Regards to Statutes That
Differentiate on the Basis of Race
Beginning in the 1970s, the Court repeatedly divided over the
appropriate standard of review for race-based affirmative action programs
without formulating a single approach. Meanwhile, a second line of cases
emerged involving statutes that discriminated on the basis of race without
any remedial purpose. The Court subjected the latter to its “most rigid
scrutiny,” and except in the most extreme circumstances, found them
unconstitutional.83
Following Brown v. Board of Education,84 the vast majority of statutes
that discriminated on the basis of race were subjected to a rigid level of
review by the Court and as a result were found unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Between Brown in
1954, and Croson in 1989, the Court struck down a variety of statutes
including, among others, those that banned interracial cohabitation85 and
marriage,86 eliminated integrated public pools,87 or rewarded custody of
children based in part on the race of the potential stepfather.88 Meanwhile,
the Court explicitly endorsed remedial schemes, in particular those in the
82. Id. at 381-82. Instead of focusing on the parents’ presence, the court’s decision
centered around the parents’ interest: “This impediment to adoption usually is the result
of a natural parental interest shared by both genders alike; it is not a manifestation of
any profound difference between the affection and concern of mothers and fathers for
their children.” Id. at 391-92.
83. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
84. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
85. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
86. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
87. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
88. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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context of elementary and secondary education.89
The Court’s first encounter with an affirmative action program outside of
this context came in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,90
involving a program that reserved a specific number of seats for minorities
at the University of California-Davis medical school.91 The Court’s
judgment was controlled by Justice Powell who, writing only for himself,
concluded that all racial classifications were subject to the same heightened
review, and under which he found the program unconstitutional.92 The
remaining eight justices split equally between those who would have
applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld the statute93 and those who would
have struck it down as violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964.94 Only two
years later in Fullilove v. Klutznick,95 the Court upheld a federal program
that required a proportion of federal funds granted to state and local
governments to be used to procure services or supplies from Minority
Business Enterprises. Mirroring his opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell
subjected the scheme to the “most stringent level of review.”96 However,
in contrast to Bakke, he found that the remedy justified the “compelling
governmental interest.”97
Between 1980, when it decided Fullilove, and 1989, when it decided
Croson, the Court remained closely divided on which affirmative action
measures could be utilized to remedy employment discrimination. At a
minimum, the Court agreed that race conscious goals designed to alleviate
past discrimination were not per se unconstitutional.98 Nonetheless, the
court routinely struck down provisions that it found loosely drafted or
89. In Brown v. Bd. of Educ. II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the Supreme Court explicitly
empowered local courts, as well as local school boards, to implement remedial schemes
to address the history of school segregation in each locality. Though the Court
provided broad guidelines for local authorities to follow, it also invested localities with
broad authority, including, but not limited to “revision of school districts and
attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to
the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations
which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems.” Id. at 300-01.
90. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion).
91. Id. at 269-70.
92. Id. at 291.
93. Id. at 324, 379 (Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
94. Id. at 420-21 (Stevens, J., Burger, J., Stewart, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
96. Id. at 496.
97. Id.
98. See e.g., Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,
475 (1986) (upholding the municipalities affirmative action plan).
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unconnected to the remediation of past wrongs.99 Similarly, while the
Court made clear that such statutes posed serious constitutional problems
and must therefore be closely scrutinized, it was unable to formulate either
a verbal standard or describe a series of characteristics upon which it would
base its analysis.100
2. Richmond v. Croson
At issue in Croson was a “Minority Business Utilization Plan” (Plan)
adopted by the City of Richmond requiring general contractors awarded
city construction contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the total
dollar value of each contract to one or more “Minority Business
Enterprises” (MBE’s). The Plan defined a MBE as a business from
anywhere in the country in which at least fifty-one percent of the enterprise
was owned and controlled by “black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian,
Eskimo, or Aleutian citizens.”101 Waivers from such requirements were
available only upon a showing that either an insufficient number of MBE’s
existed or were willing to participate.102 Although the Plan characterized
itself as “remedial,”103 it was passed without the presentation of any
empirical evidence that the city of Richmond had discriminated in
awarding contracts or that prime contractors had discriminated in awarding
subcontracts.104 In support of the Plan, the city council primarily
considered evidence of current minority under-representation in the field,
specifically:
[A] statistical study indicating that, although the city’s population was
50% black, only 0.67% of its prime construction contracts had been
awarded to minority businesses in recent years; figures establishing that
a variety of local contractors’ associations had virtually no MBE
members; the city’s counsel’s conclusion that the Plan was constitutional
under Fullilove v. Klutznick, and the statements of Plan proponents
indicating that there had been widespread racial discrimination in the
local, state, and national construction industries.105

Croson, the sole bidder, upon denial of a waiver and subsequently the
99. See e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 199 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“But protection of the rights of nonminority workers demands that a racial
goal not substantially exceed the percentage of minority group members in the relevant
population or work force absent compelling justification.”).
100. See e.g., Winston Riddick, Overview of U.S. Supreme Court Affirmative Action
Decisions in Race and Gender Cases, 23 S.U. L. REV. 107, 111-13 (1996).
101. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1989).
102. Id. at 478-79.
103. Id. at 478.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 479-80.
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prime contract, filed suit alleging that the Plan was unconstitutional under
the Equal Protection Clause.106
For the first time, five members of the Court agreed that strict scrutiny
was the appropriate standard for statutes that differentiated on the basis of
race, regardless of any benign or discriminatory legislative intent.107 In
doing so, the Court explicitly rejected an intermediate standard of review as
insufficient. It explained:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such racebased measures, there is simply no way of determining what
classifications are “benign” or “remedial” and what classifications are
in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple
racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to “smoke out”
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing
a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool . . . .
[Using intermediate review] [o]nce the “remedial” conclusion is reached,
the dissent’s standard is singularly deferential, and bears little
resemblance to the close examination of legislative purpose we have
engaged in when reviewing classifications based either on race or
gender.108

The Court additionally suggested that because it did not require specific
evidence of discrimination in the locality, the intermediate scrutiny
standard would allow a historically disadvantaged group currently in the
majority essentially limitless scope and duration to utilize race-based
schemes—potentially to a degree beyond that necessary to redress any
discrimination suffered.109 Finally, the Court suggested that without the
factual basis requirement imposed by strict scrutiny, the fact finder may not
be able to determine whether the problem the state seeks to remedy actually
exists.110 That is, the problem may not be that African-Americans are not
being selected because of their race but rather “because of deficiencies in
working capital, inability to meet bonding requirements, unfamiliarity with
bidding procedures, or disability caused by an inadequate track record”—
problems which, in the eyes of the court, afflict all ethnic groups equally.111

106. Id. at 483.
107. Id. at 493.
108. Id. at 493, 495.
109. See id. at 495-96 (“In this case, blacks constitute approximately 50% of the
population of the city of Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the city council are held
by blacks. The concern that a political majority will more easily act to the
disadvantage of a minority based on unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts
would seem to militate for, not against, the application of heightened judicial scrutiny
in this case.”).
110. Id. at 498.
111. Id. at 499.
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Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that the Plan failed both prongs
of the test—the state was unable to show that the statutory scheme served a
compelling governmental interest or was narrowly tailored to accomplish
such.112 The Court rejected the state’s asserted interest in remedying prior
race-based discrimination, not because such an interest would never be
sufficient, but because the state’s interest was merely a generalized
remedial assertion. In the eyes of the Court, because no specific history of
discrimination was proven or considered, “[the evidence] provided no
guidance for the city’s legislative body to determine the precise scope of
the injury it [sought] to remedy.”113 Therefore, after Croson, to survive
strict scrutiny, “judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations must be made” in the specific field the
program affects, and which occurred in the specific locality passing the
legislation.114
C. The Decline of Intermediate Scrutiny: The Supreme Court’s and Lower
Courts’ Equal Protection Jurisprudence After Croson
Though the Supreme Court has not decided another case involving a
“benign” gender classification after Hogan, lower courts’ jurisprudence
with regard to gender-based affirmative action programs has significantly
shifted after Croson. While the majority of circuits continue to apply
intermediate scrutiny, a minority have split over whether to apply strict
scrutiny, or alternatively intermediate scrutiny, with Croson’s strict factual
predicate.115
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence has largely been limited to race-based affirmative action
programs and gender-based discriminatory schemes. However, a number
of scholars aware of the circuit split and the Supreme Court’s increased
scrutiny of race-based affirmative action programs have entered the
discussion in favor of strict scrutiny for all gender classifications.
1. The Varied Standards Lower Courts After Croson Have Applied to
Gender-Based Affirmative Action Programs
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court in Croson confined its decision
to race-based classifications, a limited number of circuits have adopted
strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for gender-based
affirmative action programs. A second group of circuit courts, while
continuing to espouse intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard of
112. Id. at 505-507.
113. Id. at 498.
114. Id. at 497.
115. Concrete Works of Colo. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 958 (10th
Cir. 2003).
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review, have interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as requiring Croson’s
strict factual predicate before a remedial program can be undertaken.
However, the majority of circuit courts after Croson have continued to
apply intermediate scrutiny when examining such programs.
i.

Strict Scrutiny

Only the Sixth Circuit and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals have
consistently applied strict scrutiny when reviewing gender-based
affirmative action programs. The Seventh Circuit has also applied strict
scrutiny in each of the gender-based affirmative action cases it has decided.
However, its decisions have not been constitutionally based.
In Conlin v. Blanchard,116 the Sixth Circuit invalidated a gender and
race-based affirmative action program after applying strict scrutiny
uniformly to both aspects of the program.117 The court provided no
explanation as to why strict scrutiny was appropriate to the gender-based
classification beyond citing the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed.118 In Wygant, decided during the period
between Bakke and Croson, a plurality of the Court concluded that strict
scrutiny was the appropriate standard for race-based affirmative action
programs.119
The Federal Circuit invalidated a similar program that instructed Air
Force personnel to consider the discrimination that a woman or minority
may have endured before determining whether an individual employed by
the military should be involuntarily terminated.120 The court without
citation or explanation stated that both classifications were subject to strict
scrutiny and invalidated both.121 Curiously, the court, in a footnote, cited
United States v. Virginia’s “exceedingly persuasive justification”122
language, though it ignored entirely the Court’s explicit admission that it
was applying intermediate scrutiny.
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit has also applied a single strict scrutiny
standard when analyzing affirmative action plans that differentiate on the
basis of race and gender. However, the court in each case has done so only
because the state failed to argue that each classification merited a different
standard. Furthermore, in two of the cases, the court did so only after
116.
117.
118.
119.
text.
120.
121.
122.

Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 812.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
Id. at 283-84 (plurality opinion); see also supra note 115 and accompanying
Berkley v. United States, 287 F.3d 1076, 1082 (2002).
Id.
Id. at n.1.
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explicitly stating that the issue remained an open one in the Seventh
Circuit. In Milwaukee Pavers Ass’n v. Fiedler,123 after acknowledging that
the Supreme Court did “not consider discrimination against women to be as
invidious” and thus, “maybe the state’s program, insofar as it favors
women, [was] not controlled by Croson,” Judge Posner concluded that “the
state [had] waived the argument by failing to make it, and by its silence
[had] thus conceded that Croson applies to affirmative action in favor of
women just as it does to affirmative action in favor of blacks and other
racial and ethnic minorities.”124 The court has since twice used identical
reasoning to strike down similar statutes.125
ii.

Intermediate Scrutiny “Plus”

Meanwhile, the Fourth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, after Croson, have
maintained the characterization of the scrutiny applied to gender-based
affirmative action programs as “intermediate”; however, in application,
each circuit has required a factual predicate equivalent to that required by
the Supreme Court in Croson.
In Lamprecht v. FCC,126 then-Judge Clarence Thomas, writing for the
D.C. Circuit, found unconstitutional the FCC’s adoption of three programs
that would cumulatively have had the effect of increasing female
ownership of broadcast stations: the awarding of tax certificates, the
holding of distress sales, and the giving of preferences in the comparativelicensing process.127 While the court, relying upon Craig, declared
intermediate scrutiny to be the appropriate standard, it analyzed the factual
basis presented by the state in a manner reminiscent of Croson. Though
the court accepted the state’s interest in furthering the diversity of
123. Milwaukee Pavers Ass’n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
500 U.S. 954 (1991).
124. Id. at 422.
125. See N. Contr., Inc. v. Illinois, 473 F.3d 715, 720 n.3 (7th Cir. 2007) (“As we
have previously discussed, the Supreme Court has not made clear whether a more
permissive standard applies to programs, such as this one, which also involve gender
classifications, but IDOT does not argue for a more permissive standard for its genderbased initiatives and therefore we will apply strict scrutiny to the entire program.”); see
also Builders Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. Cnty. of Cook, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1093
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (“The parties in this case do not argue that there could be different
results as between the preferences for minorities and the preference for women.
Plaintiff argues that there is no justifiable basis for either of the preferences, and
defendants contend that both preferences are amply justified by the evidence.
Therefore, while recognizing that there are different levels of scrutiny for the two
groups, it will not be necessary to make a separate analysis of the evidence applicable
to minorities and to women.”).
126. Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
127. Id. at 383-84.
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programming,128 it disputed whether the evidence presented proved that the
means utilized—increasing female ownership of media stations—
accomplished this goal.129 The FCC among other things presented
evidence that: (1) “of the recipients of the 1986 “National Commendation
Awards” for presenting women in a “positive and realistic light,” women
made up 58.5% of the producers, 84.2% of the writers, and 92.9% of the
reporter/hosts;”130 (2) women are majority owners of only 8.6% of AM
stations, 9% of FM stations, and 2.8% of television stations;131 and (3)
stations owned by women are “twenty percent more likely than stations
owned by men to broadcast “women’s programming,” and about thirty
percent more likely than stations owned by non-minorities to broadcast
“minority programming.”132 In rejecting the FCC’s claim, the court
presented a series of counter statistics, which in its view proved the
negligible effects of the program.133
Similarly, in Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Department,134 the Eleventh
Circuit, though applying intermediate scrutiny, required that the local
government prove that it had specifically discriminated against women “in
the economic sphere at which the affirmative action program is
directed.”135 However, in contrast to Lamprecht, the Danskine court upheld
the state’s preferential program aimed at the increased employment of
female firefighters.136 Among other things, it emphasized the history of
discrimination within the particular department on which the program
focused:
The Fire Department excluded women from its workforce up until the
early 1980s; that as recently as 1983 the Department’s workforce was
only one percent female while the general population of Dade County

128. See id. at 384 (“We hold that merit for female ownership and participation is
warranted upon essentially the same basis as the merit given for black ownership and
participation, but that it is a merit of lesser significance.”).
129. Id. at 398.
130. Id. at 396.
131. Id. at 409 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 404 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 397; see also H.B. Rowe Co., Inc. v. Tippett, 615 F.3d 233 (4th Cir.
2010) (rejecting a state program that set goals for the number of females receiving state
construction contracts, because even though women on average earned contracts that
were worth only one-third of the contracts afforded men, the state failed to present
evidence that private and public employers discriminated against women and that
women personally felt discriminated against; thus, the disparity may have been the
result of “mere chance”).
134. Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Dep’t, 253 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2001).
135. Id. at 1294.
136. Id. at 1289.
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was fifty-two percent female.137

iii. Intermediate Scrutiny
However, the Second,138 Third,139 Fifth,140 Ninth,141 and Tenth Circuits142
have continued to apply the intermediate scrutiny standard initially
formulated in Craig and described later as “exceedingly persuasive” in
Hogan.143 Emblematic of this approach is the Tenth Circuit’s decision in
Concrete Works of Colorado v. Denver, in which it upheld Denver’s
established participation goals for racial minorities and women on certain
city construction and professional design projects.144 As opposed to
requiring a strict factual predicate, the court accepted as sufficient evidence
that the state’s decision was the result of “reasoned analysis rather than . . .

137. Id. at 1290.
138. United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 136 n.76 (2011).
139. See Contractors Ass’n v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1001 (3d Cir. 1993) (“We
agree with the district court’s choice of intermediate scrutiny to review the Ordinance’s
gender preference.”).
140. The sole case from the Fifth Circuit to involve an equal protection challenge to
a gender-based affirmative action program is Dallas Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of
Dallas, 150 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 1998). At issue was an affirmative action program that
allegedly resulted in the promotion of “black, hispanic [sic], and female firefighters
ahead of male, nonminority firefighters who had scored higher on the promotion
examinations.” Id. at 440. According to the decision, the city failed to present any
evidence in support of the gender-based classification. Id. at 441-42. Accordingly, the
court invalidated the statute using intermediate scrutiny. Id. Given the absolute lack of
empirical evidence in support of the statute, it is not clear whether the Court was
applying a standard more akin to intermediate scrutiny or intermediate “plus.”
141. See Coral Constr. Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 932 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[W]e
shall employ intermediate scrutiny to review King County’s [Women-Owned Business
Enterprise] program.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992).
142. See KT&G Corp. v. AG of Okla., 535 F.3d 1114, 1137 (10th Cir. 2008) (“In
addition, there is an intermediate scrutiny which applies, for example, to gender-based
classifications.”); see also Concrete Works of Colo. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 321
F.3d 950, 959 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Denver can meet its burden by demonstrating that the
gender-based preferences ‘serve[] important governmental objectives’ and are
‘substantially related to achievement of those objectives’.”), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1027 (2003).
143. Concrete Works of Colo., 321 F.3d at 959. As stated by the Court: “To
withstand CWC’s challenge, Denver must establish an “exceedingly persuasive
justification” for those measures. Denver can meet its burden by demonstrating that the
gender-based preferences “serve[] important governmental objectives” and are
“substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Id. While the Second
Circuit has yet to decide the issue, recently the district court for the Eastern District of
New York suggested that it may also adhere to the same standard. Id.
144. Id. at 954.
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the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions.”145
Accordingly, the court reasoned that the city was under no burden to
identify any specific practice or policy that resulted in discrimination.146
The city’s only burden was to introduce evidence which raised the
inference of discriminatory exclusion in the local construction industry and
that it linked its spending to that discrimination.147 According to the court,
such an inference could arise from statistical disparities presented.148
2. Relevant Supreme Court Jurisprudence After Croson
The Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has been rather
limited since Croson in the context of statutes that differentiate on the basis
of gender. The Court, in applying the Craig standard, has considered three
gender-based statutes, approving only the most recent on the grounds that it
represented a “biological difference” between men and women.149
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has considered four racial affirmative
action programs in the educational and employment context, approving
only one on the narrowest of grounds.
i.

Gender Classification Jurisprudence

In J.E.B. v. Alabama,150 the Supreme Court held that a state’s use of
peremptory challenges to exclude male jurors on the basis of their gender
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.151
Utilizing the Court’s language from Hogan, the Court required that the
state advance an exceedingly persuasive justification, i.e., a demonstration
that the statute is substantially related to a legitimate state interest.152 The
state, presenting a single report in support of its claim, argued that persons
of each gender were more likely to support claims of someone of their own
gender.153 Finding that the authors of the report themselves had disavowed
such a conclusion,154 the Court concluded that the state’s argument in
actuality masked an unconstitutional, archaic, and overbroad stereotype.155

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 959.
Id. at 970.
Id.
Id. at 971.
See Michael M. v. Sonoma Cnty. Sup. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 478 (1981).
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
Id. at 128.
Id. at 136-37.
Id. at 138 n.9.
Id.
Id. at 137-38.
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The Court emphasized that even if sufficient data had been presented, the
stereotype would have been fatal to the practice.156 The message sent by
the policy “to all those in the courtroom, and all those who may later learn
of the discriminatory act, is that certain individuals, for no reason other
than gender, are presumed unqualified by state actors to decide important
questions upon which reasonable persons could disagree.”157
Two years later, the Court again struck down a statute based on
unfounded characterizations. In United States v. Virginia,158 the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a Virginia policy that barred women from
admission to the Virginia Military Institute.159 Characterizing the Hogan
language as requiring an “exceedingly persuasive justification”,160 the
Court rejected as illegitimate the state interest asserted—namely that “the
adversative method of training [provided by VMI] provided educational
benefits that [could not] be made available, unmodified, to women” and
that any alterations would destroy the model.161 The Court relied heavily
on the history of exclusion of women from various educational fields, and
disregarded the expert testimony presented by the state, concluding that the
policy, in light of the nation’s history, qualified as an unconstitutional and
archaic generalization.162 While not central to her decision, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, who argued many of the gender classification cases before
the Court during the 1970s,163 explicitly emphasized that despite the
Court’s increasing skepticism of gender-based classifications, gender-based
classifications could be used to compensate women for particular economic
disabilities suffered as a result of their gender,164 to promote equal

156. See id. at 140 (explaining that discrimination in jury selection has harmful
effects on the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are “wrongfully
excluded from the judicial process”).
157. Id. at 142.
158. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
159. See id. at 541 (finding that Virginia failed to provide persuasive evidence that a
school’s male-only entrance policy was in furtherance of a state policy of diversity).
160. Id. at 531.
161. Id. at 540, 544-45.
162. See id. at 541-44 (“The notion that admission of women would downgrade
VMI’s stature, destroy the adversative system and, with it, even the school, is a
judgment hardly proved, a prediction hardly different from other ‘self-fulfilling
prophec[ies],’ once routinely used to deny rights or opportunities . . . .”) (footnotes
omitted).
163. Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803,
829-30 (1990).
164. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320
(1977)) (per curiam).
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employment opportunities,165 and to advance the full development of the
talent and capacities of citizens.166
Despite its growing criticism of gender-based classifications, the Court
in Nguyen v. INS,167 suggested that biological differences existed between
the genders, and thus, could justify such a classification even when the
state failed to provide evidentiary support. In Nguyen, the statute, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409,168 under an equal protection challenge, was upheld by the Supreme
Court despite its imposition of differing requirements for an immigrant
child’s acquisition of citizenship depending upon whether the citizen parent
was the mother or the father.169 Applying the language from Hogan,170 the
Court accepted, among other things, the government’s interest in assuring a
legitimate parent-child connection in such matters and found the genderbased presumption to be substantially related to its interests.171 Though
five justices sided with the majority, the Court’s female justices dissented,
emphasizing that the stereotypical assumption behind the statute—that
women were the primary caretakers of children—was of the type the Court
had consistently rejected after Hogan.172
ii.

Racial Classification Jurisprudence

In contrast, the Supreme Court has consistently applied strict scrutiny to
racial classifications, while, in most instances, also demanding increasingly
more of the government. In Adarand Constructors v. Peña,173 the Supreme
Court extended Croson to federal affirmative action programs, reasoning
that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard under which to examine a
federal program giving prime contractors financial incentives to hire
subcontractors certified as “small businesses controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals,” under the presumption that such
165. Id. (quoting California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289
(1987)).
166. Id. at 533-34.
167. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001).
168. 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2013).
169. A child born abroad and out of wedlock acquires at birth the nationality status
of a citizen mother who meets a specified residency requirement. § 1409(c). However,
when the father is the citizen parent, inter alia, one of three affirmative steps must be
taken before the child turns eighteen: legitimization, a declaration of paternity under
oath by the father, or a court order of paternity. § 1409(a)(4). The failure to satisfy this
section renders Nguyen ineligible for citizenship.
170. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 70.
171. See id. at 73 (noting that this presumption was gained from the fact that every
woman must necessarily be present at her child’s birth).
172. Id. at 88-90 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
173. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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a group included an increased number of minorities.174 Though the Court
denied that strict scrutiny was “fatal in fact,”175 the Court cited a single
case, decided before Croson, in which a racial classification survived strict
scrutiny.176
Despite its prior pronouncements, the Court drew a narrow exception for
racial classifications in the context of higher education. In Grutter v.
Bollinger177 and Gratz v. Bollinger,178 the Court split over a series of
affirmative action cases concerning the University of Michigan’s
undergraduate program and its law school. While the court struck down a
program which used a mathematical bonus system for minorities,179 the
Court, in a five to four decision, upheld the Law School’s preference
program as narrowly tailored to the state’s compelling interest in achieving
a diverse educational environment.180 Importantly, the Court noted that
while strict scrutiny applies to “all governmental uses of race . . . not all are
invalidated by it.”181 Rather, “context matters.”182 In Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,183 the Court struck
down two secondary school plans that considered race as a factor when
determining whether a minority or non-minority student would be allowed
to transfer from one secondary school to another.184 While the majority
decision emphasized, in part, the computational nature of the plan,185 the
Court also emphasized that any deference afforded in the context in higher
education was not applicable to plans enacted by elementary and secondary
schools.186 Additionally, the Court’s recent acceptance of certiorari in
174. See id. at 204-05, 226 (discussing Croson’s explanation of why “strict
scrutiny of all governmental racial classifications is essential”).
175. Id. at 237.
176. See id. at 226-27 (referencing Metro Broadcasting’s unique ruling that certain
racial classifications should be treated less skeptically than others; and the race of the
benefited group is critical to the determination of which standard of review to apply).
177. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
178. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
179. See id. at 255, 275-76 (finding that the admissions policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
180. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
181. Id. at 326-27.
182. Id. at 327.
183. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
184. Id. at 709-711, 783.
185. See id. at 723 (stating that the method employed in this case does not provide
for a meaningful individualized review of applicants, but instead rely on racial
classifications in a non-individualized, mechanical way).
186. See id. at 770-71 (arguing that the Grutter decision was dependent upon
“features unique to higher education” that were not present in elementary and
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Fisher v. University of Texas,187 which involved a scheme nearly identical
to the one the Court approved in Grutter188 and invited harsh questioning
from several of the justices during the hearings of the case,189 has caused
concern that strict scrutiny in the context of racial classifications may
indeed be fatal in fact.
3. Scholarly Criticism of Intermediate Scrutiny
Buttressed by the Court’s increasing scrutiny of race-based affirmative
action programs and a number of lower courts’ increased scrutiny of such
programs in the gender context, a number of scholars have weighed in and
criticized the application of intermediate scrutiny to gender-based
classifications. Their criticisms can be classified into four categories: (a)
doctrinal arguments that strict scrutiny is the correct approach based on the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence;190 (b) insufficient protection arguments
that intermediate scrutiny is insufficient to guard against invidious or
discriminatory statutes;191 (c) stigmatic arguments that a lower level of
scrutiny implicitly delivers a message that women are less important than
other minority groups;192 and (d) inconsistency arguments that the Court’s

secondary education, such as “the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated
with the university environment, the special niche in the constitutional tradition
occupied by universities, and the freedom of a university to make its own judgments as
to education and selection of its student body”) (citations omitted).
187. 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012).
188. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 216-17 (describing University of Texas at Austin’s
system of guaranteeing admission to Texas students in the top ten percent of their
class).
189. See Adam Liptak, Justices Weigh Race as Factor at Universities, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2012, at A1 (stating the Justice Roberts, Alito, Scalia, and Thomas shared a
skepticism of government programs that take race into account).
190. See Dale A. Riedel, By Way of the Dodo: The Unconstitutionality of the
Selective Service Act Male-Only Registration Requirement Under Modern GenderBased Equal Protection, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 135, 148 (2003) (arguing that the
intermediate scrutiny plus test is the appropriate test after VMI); see also Jason Skaggs,
Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under United States v. Virginia’s
“Exceedingly Persuasive Justification” Standard, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1193 (1998)
(arguing that there has been a progression in the level of scrutiny required for genderbased affirmative action programs).
191. See e.g., John Galotto, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, Via Croson, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 508, 538 (1993) (discussing the special dangers of racial and sex stereotyping).
192. See Collin O’Connor Udell, Signaling A New Direction In Gender
Classification Scrutiny: United States v. Virginia, 29 CONN. L. REV. 521, 557 (1996)
(“[I]t would be difficult, indeed, to justify applying strict scrutiny to racial affirmative
action programs without applying it to gender-based affirmative action programs as
well. The rationale behind Croson and Adarand stressed the individual’s right to equal
treatment, regardless of the group to which she belonged, and it is equally applicable to
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jurisprudence with regard to racial and gender-based affirmative action is
theoretically inconsistent based on the Equal Protection Clause’s original
intention to aid African-Americans.193
II. A SECOND CHANCE: THE CONTINUED LEGAL AND THEORETICAL
VIABILITY OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AFTER CROSON
Despite the criticisms from circuit courts and legal scholars, intermediate
scrutiny remains the appropriate standard under which to review genderbased affirmative action programs. Considering that the Supreme Court
generally applies intermediate scrutiny when analyzing gender-based
claims and is especially lenient when considering benign classifications,
the strict scrutiny argument is not persuasive from a doctrinal perspective.
Arguments stressing the theoretical inconsistency of a more lenient
standard for gender-based remedial schemes as opposed to race-based
programs, while compelling, assume that Croson, which in fact created the
discrepancy, was correctly decided. More compelling are the stigmatic and
insufficient protection arguments. While they each present significant
concerns, viable alternatives are available that, in contrast to strict scrutiny,
will not have the practical effect of eliminating affirmative action programs
for women.

A. The Legal Basis: Why Intermediate Scrutiny Remains the Appropriate
Standard for Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under the Court’s
Precedent
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has never addressed the
constitutionality of a gender-based affirmative action program in the
employment context, three doctrinal considerations suggest that
intermediate scrutiny would be the appropriate standard under which to
review such programs. First, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence dictates
that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard for all benign gender
classifications.194 Second, often when lower courts apply strict scrutiny,
gender-based affirmative action.”).
193. See Skaggs, supra note 190, at 1175 (arguing that use of intermediate scrutiny
for sex based classifications yields results that are at odds with the Court’s emphasis on
historic discrimination against protected groups as justification for invoking heightened
scrutiny).
194. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that for a statute that
differentiates on the basis of gender to be sustained, it “must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives”); see also Udell, supra note 192, at 527-28 (stating that Craig created a
new standard of intermediate scrutiny).
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they do so while considering race-based and gender-based programs
jointly.195 Third, while “intermediate plus” may seem to be a suitable
compromise, the Supreme Court, when applying intermediate scrutiny, has
focused on the purpose and legislative history of the statute, as opposed to
strength of the empirical evidence presented in support of the asserted
interest.196
1. The Supreme Court’s Gender-Based Jurisprudence Makes Clear That
Intermediate Scrutiny is the Appropriate Standard.
A review of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence makes clear that
intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard for gender-based
affirmative action schemes. The Sixth Circuit in Long incorrectly adopted
strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard under which to judge genderbased affirmative action claims and ignored significant Supreme Court
jurisprudence to the contrary. Specifically, in making its decision, the
Sixth Circuit relied exclusively on the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Croson and Frontiero.197
Citing Croson, the court concluded that affirmative action programs are
appropriately judged under a strict scrutiny standard.198 The court in its
analysis made no mention of the fact that the statute at issue in Croson
involved solely a racial classification.199 None of the justices in any of
their separate opinions suggested that their ruling extended beyond racial
classifications.200
Likewise, the court’s reliance on Frontiero was similarly misguided.
First, Frontiero was followed by a series of cases, including the Supreme
Court’s seminal decision in Craig, which established intermediate scrutiny
as the appropriate standard of review for all gender classifications.201
Notably, the Frontiero decision was the sole decision to use strict scrutiny
when reviewing a gender-based classification. The court’s decision in
195. See e.g., Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1989) (considering a
case where the Michigan Department of Transportation used a hiring criteria based on
race or gender when the applicant’s race or gender was underrepresented in the relevant
labor market).
196. See e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136-40 (1994).
197. See Long v. Saginaw, 911 F.2d 1192, 1196 (6th Cir. 1990).
198. Id.
199. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 478 (1989) (assessing a
contracting arrangement where prime contractors were required to issue a certain
percentage of subcontracts to businesses controlled and owned by racial minorities).
200. Cf. id.
201. See Udell, supra note 192, at 527-28 (stating that the intermediate scrutiny
standard was established for gender discrimination purposes in Craig and has been
consistently employed ever since).
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Long did not mention the nearly thirty years of cases since, in which the
Supreme Court has continually applied the intermediate scrutiny
standard.202 Second, even if we were to ignore decades of jurisprudence,
Frontiero occurred after congressional passage of the Equal Rights
Amendment.203 Even if the court considered applying strict scrutiny to all
gender-based classifications, its approach was heavily influenced by the
context of the times. Third, while the Supreme Court suggested in
Frontiero that “strict judicial review” may be appropriate, it was evaluating
a statute that disadvantaged the value of the work of the female
employee.204 Accordingly, there was a reasonable basis to argue that the
statute, instead of benefiting female spouses, had a detrimental effect on a
significant portion of females. In contrast, gender-based affirmative action
programs have no similar adverse effect on a significant portion of the
female population.205 Rather, females enjoy the benefit of these programs
across the board. The Supreme Court stated as much, noting that the
analysis would have differed had a benign classification been at issue.206
The arguments of scholars in support of strict scrutiny are no more
persuasive. Their arguments suggest that the Court has in fact been
gradually heightening the standard of review for gender classifications.
The argument takes one of two versions. First, some scholars suggest that
the Supreme Court’s use of the terminology “exceedingly persuasive
justification” in a number of cases subsequent to Hogan indicates a stricter
level of review.207 Second, other scholars suggest that while repeating the
intermediate scrutiny test, the Court actually has been conducting a more
stringent review.208
As to the semantic argument, while the Court describes intermediate
202. See Long v. City of Saginaw, 911 F.2d 1192, 1192 (6th Cir. 1990).
203. See supra notes 29 and accompanying text.
204. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (“With these
considerations in mind, we can only conclude that classifications based upon sex, like
classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and
must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.”).
205. Cf. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (examining a
nursing school’s policy of excluding all male applicants and allowing admission only
for female students); supra note 127 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (stating that the Supreme Court in
Frontiero made sure to point out that this was not a statute designed to rectify the
history of discrimination against women, but a statute which was to their detriment).
207. See e.g., Skaggs, supra note 190, at 1183 (writing that the “exceedingly
persuasive justification” standard established in Hogan was a more demanding level of
scrutiny than intermediate scrutiny).
208. See e.g., Reidel, supra note 190, at 137 (stating that the Supreme Court
implemented a “new version of the intermediate scrutiny test” in the cases after its
establishment by adding a third prong to the original two prong test).
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scrutiny as requiring an “exceedingly persuasive justification,” it defines
this test as merely the intermediate scrutiny standard from Craig—that a
measure be substantially related to an important governmental interest.209
Furthermore, none of the cases in which the Court used this verbal
formulation involved benign gender classifications.210
While the substantive argument is more compelling, it is similarly
problematic. Though the Supreme Court, while utilizing the “exceedingly
persuasive justification” language invalidated a greater number of cases,
this was largely due to the comparable simplicity of these cases. In J.E.B,
the Court considered a practice that allowed men to be barred from juries
on the basis of gender.211 Similarly, in VMI, the court invalidated a policy
that barred women from an all-male military school solely on the basis of
their gender.212 Each of these cases stunk of the type of discrimination the
Supreme Court struck down when dismantling segregation in the postBrown period.213 In Nguyen, where the issue was somewhat closer—
whether admitted biological differences between women and men justified
a presumption of citizenship in favor of the child of an American citizen
mother and a non-citizen father as opposed to the converse—the Court
upheld the statute.214
In contrast, many of the statutes the Court considered and invalidated
prior to the formulation of the intermediate scrutiny standard involved
statutes where the discrimination was much more subtle and, accordingly,
required closer attention from the Court. The Court in Weinberger
concluded, after only a cursory examination of the legislative history, that a
statute that gave a financial bonus to women, and thus seemed to be on its
face benign, actually demeaned the value of their work and furthered a
“homemaker” stereotype.215 Similarly in Orr, the Court examined a statute
that created a presumption of alimony for the female divorcee. Though the
Court acknowledged the purely benign purpose behind the statute, the
Court nonetheless advised guarding against stereotypes and reasoned that
209. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (using the case of J.E.B. v.
Alabama to demonstrate that the standard of “exceedingly persuasive justification”
required the same test used under the intermediate scrutiny test).
210. See supra notes 66-68, 150, 158 and accompanying text (referring to the Hogan
case’s exclusion of males from nursing schools, the J.E.B. case’s use of peremptory
challenges to exclude male jurors, and the VMI case’s prohibition on admitting women
to the Virginia Military Institute).
211. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
212. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555-56 (1996).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 85 (recounting several race-based cases the
Court struck down after its decision in Brown).
214. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
215. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975).
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when one was available, a narrower remedial scheme should have been
utilized.216
2. When Lower Courts Utilize Strict Scrutiny, It Has Been the Result of
Confusion.
The decisions of the lower courts to apply strict scrutiny, rather than
being based on sound precedent, have been the result of confusion and
mistake. In particular, decisions adopting a standard of review more
stringent than intermediate scrutiny have often been complicated by the
fact that they involved challenges to statutes that granted benefits to racial
minorities, as well as women.
In many of these cases, as opposed to recognizing the Supreme Court’s
varying jurisprudence with regard to each type of suspect classification,
these courts have analyzed the racial provisions under strict scrutiny, while
at the same time ignoring that distinct gender-conscious provisions were
also at issue. In Conlin, the Sixth Circuit completely failed to distinguish
between discrimination aimed at race-based minorities and discrimination
against women.217 The court looked to Wygant despite the fact that only a
plurality of the Court218 adopted a strict scrutiny standard of review for
race-based classifications.219 What the Conlin court failed to articulate,
however, was that the gender-based set-aside programs were subject to a
more lenient standard of review. Instead, the court erroneously grouped the
gender-based set-aside provisions with the race-based portions of the act
during its review.220
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in Milwaukee Pavers, rather than
deciding the issue on its merits, simply deemed the argument waived, as
Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to argue that the gender-based portion of the
statute was subject to a lesser degree of scrutiny.221 The limited
constitutional significance of the decision was highlighted when the court
was faced with a similar statute nine years later in Builders Association of
Chicago, in which the court avoided relying on the Milwaukee Pavers
precedent and instead again concluded that the argument was waived

216. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
217. Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1989).
218. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986) (stating that
strict scrutiny is to be used in assessing racial classifications).
219. See Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1989) (looking to Wygant
and holding that “any remedy which uses sex or race must be narrowly tailored to
survive scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment”).
220. See id.
221. See supra note 123-124 and accompanying text.
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because it was not presented.222
3. Intermediate Scrutiny “Plus” Focuses Incorrectly on a History of
Discrimination and Not Legislative History and Statutory Scheme.
Recognizing the Supreme Court’s continuous application of the
intermediate scrutiny standard to all gender-based classifications, while
also acknowledging the Court’s increased scrutiny of racial-based
affirmative action programs, a minority of scholars suggest that the Court
adopt intermediate scrutiny “plus” as the appropriate standard under which
to review gender-based affirmative action programs.223
However,
intermediate scrutiny “plus,” which focuses on empirical support as
opposed to the statute’s text and history, is fundamentally incompatible
with the Supreme Court’s gender jurisprudence under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Intermediate scrutiny “plus,” while not requiring that the means used by
the remedial program be narrowly tailored, does mandate the presentation
of a sufficient factual predicate that can demonstrate discrimination by the
specific locality in the specific industry covered by the remedial
program.224 For example, in Danskine, the Eleventh Circuit required the
presentation of specific evidence that the Miami-Dade County Fire
Department discriminated against women in the past.225 Despite the fact
that the Commission in Lamprecht presented detailed reports describing
disparity in station ownership and the effectiveness of the proposed
remedy, the court, utilizing its own counter evidence, held the policy
unconstitutional.226
However, the Supreme Court, when assessing the legitimacy of a
gender-based affirmative action scheme, has not required extensive proof
of a specific factual predicate, but rather has focused on whether reliance
on a stereotype could be discerned from the statute’s language and
legislative history. In Weinberger, the Court found unconstitutional a
statute creating a presumption of social security benefits for widows with
children because its text specifically linked women to the stereotypical role
of homemaker.227 Likewise, in Goldfarb, the Court struck down a similar

222. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
223. See Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. Cnty. of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 647
(7th Cir. 2001); Dale A. Riedel, By Way of the Dodo: The Unconstitutionality of the
Selective Service Act Male-Only Registration Requirement Under Modern GenderBased Equal Protection, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 135, 137 (2003).
224. See Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
225. See Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Dep’t, 253 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2001).
226. See Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 397, 399.
227. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975).
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statute that created a presumption of benefits for widows as opposed to
widowers regardless of any dependent children.228 The Court reasoned that
based on its legislative history and statutory scheme, it resulted not from a
deliberate congressional intention to remedy the greater needs of widows,
but rather from an intention to aid the dependent spouses of deceased wage
earners.229
In fact, when the Court has found a discriminatory purpose, it has
ignored statistical data presented in support of a scheme. In Craig, despite
the state’s presentation of statistical studies supporting the belief that
eighteen year old men were more likely to drive intoxicated than eighteen
year old women, the Court disregarded such presentations and focused
instead on the legislature’s reliance on stereotypes.230 In J.E.B., the Court
found insufficient the state’s statistical presentation in support of a state
policy allowing males to be excluded from juries on the basis of gender
where the policy reinforced prejudicial views of the relative abilities of
men and women.231 Accordingly, an appropriate compromise, rather than
requiring additional data, would involve more rigorous scrutiny of a
scheme’s statutory structure and purpose.
This approach is further buttressed by the institutional limitations of the
courts. Appellate courts do not have the resources or fact-finding
capabilities possessed by the legislatures.232 Accordingly, it is more likely
that the evidence considered will often suit a deciding judge’s own personal
biases, something that the multi-member nature of the legislature prevents.
Even assuming the availability of sufficient evidence, it is debatable
whether available data justifies a particular policy decision, especially
when made by a single person or small group of individuals.
B. The Theoretical Foundation: Responses to Criticisms Concerning
the Wisdom of an Intermediate Scrutiny Approach
Regardless of the lack of doctrinal support for the intermediate standard,
scholars have presented a number of theoretical criticisms of intermediate
scrutiny. Chief among these are the insufficiency and stigmatic arguments;
specifically, that the use of intermediate scrutiny for gender-based statutes
demeans women by concurrently failing to adequately protect them and
sending the larger message that they are deserving of less protection than
racial minorities.233 While these arguments present serious concerns, they
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977).
Id. at 216-17 (emphasis added).
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 208-09 (1976).
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994).
Stenberg v. Carhart 530 U.S. 914, 968 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Sex as a Suspect Class: An Argument for Applying
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fail to consider (a) that there are viable alternative jurisprudential means of
protecting women than resorting to the almost universally fatal strict
scrutiny doctrine; and (b) that intermediate scrutiny for gender-based
affirmative action programs may be framed in such a way that its use
represents society’s commitment to alleviating its discriminatory history
rather than continuing it. Finally, arguments suggesting that a standard of
review for gender-based affirmative action programs should be more
lenient than that for race-based programs is inconsistent with the purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment, assume that Croson was correctly decided.
1. There are Significant Reasons to Believe that Intermediate Scrutiny Can
Adequately Protect Women While Remedying Past Discrimination.
Central to the Croson court’s decision to apply strict scrutiny to all
statutes that differentiate on the basis of gender was the supposed
insufficiency of “intermediate scrutiny” to differentiate between those
statutes that are genuinely aimed at remedying societal problems, and those
statutes aimed at perpetuating the subordinate role of women through the
use of overbroad stereotypes. While the Court’s jurisprudence suggests
this is a serious concern, alternate approaches exist that, unlike strict
scrutiny, are not fatal in fact and that may sufficiently protect women
without the risk of dismantling all gender-based affirmative action
programs.
While strict scrutiny does effectively protect women from discriminatory
statutes masked as benign, the practical effect of the strict scrutiny standard
would be the virtual elimination of almost all affirmative action programs.
Though the Supreme Court denied that strict scrutiny is fatal in fact, its
application in the context of racially differential statutes proves that this is
invariably always the case. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court has held
unconstitutional every affirmative action employment scheme that has
come before it, regardless of whether a federal or state statute has been at
issue.234 Although the Court recently upheld a preference program in the
educational admissions context at the University of Michigan,235 there are
questions regarding the vitality of even the limited program approved in
Grutter. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who provided the crucial swing
vote in the Court’s decision in Grutter, has been replaced by Justice
Samuel Alito, who has expressed disdain for affirmative action
programs.236 Likewise, Justice Kennedy, widely recognized as the current

Strict Scrutiny to Gender Discrimination, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 953, 962 (1996);
Donna Meredith Matthews, Avoiding Gender Equality, 19 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 127,
145 (1998).
234. See Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
235. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
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“swing vote” on the Court, recently voted to invalidate a high school
transfer program that considered race as one of many factors.237
The Croson majority specifically alleged that once the supporters of
intermediate scrutiny recognized a benign purpose, their review was
singularly deferential.238 While this may be the case, the Croson majority’s
analysis incorrectly ignores the level of scrutiny applied by the supporters
of the intermediate scrutiny standard in discerning whether there is a
benign purpose in the statute. In this analysis, the Court is less than
deferential. In Hogan, despite the statute “benefiting” women by reserving
each of the nursing school’s seats for women, the Court recognized that the
scheme perpetuated the stereotypical role of women as assistants and more
practically served a need that did not exist.239 In Orr, where the state’s
scheme unnecessarily relied on gender to determine perceived inequalities,
as the possibility of individual hearings for benefits was available, the
Court found the statutory provision unconstitutional.240
Admittedly, women are not protected in every circumstance by
intermediate scrutiny. Specifically, in the context of its “biological
differences” jurisprudence, the Court’s decisions in Michael M., which
assumed that women would be discouraged from sexual activity by the
possibility of pregnancy,241 and Rostker, which deferred to Congress’
decision to exclude women from the military, are especially troubling as
they rely on the very types of stereotypes about women’s capacities and
decision-making that earlier cases rejected.242
While these cases suggest the danger of an intermediate standard, their
effect and relevance may be limited as there is some evidence that the
Court has since narrowed its “biological differences” jurisprudence.
Though the Court accepted the government’s argument in Rostker,243 it
rejected VMI’s argument fifteen years later in Virginia that women could
be excluded from a military school, despite the fact that an alternate school

236. See Charles Babington & Jo Becker, 1985 Memo by Alito Has Legal Weight,
Senators Say, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/16/AR2005111602093.html (discussing a controversial
memo composed by Alito while working in the Solicitor General’s office).
237. See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701 (2007) (indicting that Justice Kennedy concurred in part, concurred in the
judgment, and filed the majority opinion).
238. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1989).
239. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982).
240. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1979).
241. See Michael M. v. Sonoma Cnty. Super. Ct, 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981).
242. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 82-83 (1981).
243. See id.
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had been opened for women.244 The viability of the Court’s biological
differences jurisprudence in the parental context is troubling given the
acceptance of the INS’ argument in Nguyen in favor of a presumption of
citizenship for children of citizen mothers as opposed to citizen fathers.245
Nonetheless, a focus on these cases misinterprets the limited scope of
this paper’s argument. While I suggest that courts should adopt
intermediate scrutiny when reviewing gender-based affirmative action
programs, they may certainly adopt a stricter standard for statutory
provisions that do not have a remedial purpose.
Admittedly, a split approach for remedial and non-remedial genderbased statutes would invite legislative attempts to mask programs
motivated by non-remedial intentions as being remedial in nature. Despite
the clear remedial purposes of some programs, such as those at issue in
Danskine or Long, other schemes, such as those in Hogan, may be more
problematic.
While the Court’s narrowing of its real differences
jurisprudence and its ability to effectively distinguish schemes, like Hogan,
caution against such dangers, more scrutiny may indeed be required.
Intermediate scrutiny “plus” does heighten the standard; however, by
requiring a strict factual predicate, it, like strict scrutiny, effectively
eliminates gender-based affirmative action programs. While the Eleventh
Circuit upheld the program at issue in Danskine, it is rare that localities will
have available the evidence of specific discrimination available to MiamiDade County. More often localities, such as those whose programs were at
issue in Long, Lamprecht, and Concrete Works of Colorado, will only have
evidence of disparity and not discriminatory intent.246 Following the
court’s jurisprudence, an alternate approach that may adequately protect
women while not eliminating the majority of affirmative action schemes
would be to require evidence of disparity between males and females in the
field, along with an increased focus on the schemes’ statutory language and
legislative history. Like the Court in Weinberger, courts could specifically
look for benefits that are tied to a woman performing a role historically
reserved for females.247 Like the Court in Orr, courts could more closely
scrutinize statutes that rely on gender as a proxy when a non-gender-based

244. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555-56 (1996).
245. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63-64 (2001) (relying on the necessary
presence of the mother and not the father at the child’s birth); see also supra notes 7982 and accompanying text (recounting early “real differences” cases in the parental
context).
246. See Long v. City of Saginaw, 911 F.2d 1192, 1197 (6th Cir. 1990); supra notes
126-33, 144-48 and accompanying text (recounting the evidence presented in varied
gender-based affirmative action cases).
247. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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formula would just as effectively provide deserving women benefits.248
Like the Court in Goldfarb, courts could closely scrutinize a statute where
its legislative history belied a motivation other than a need to remedy past
discrimination against women, for example, the desire to devalue the work
of women earners as opposed to men.249
In addition, the Court could continue to narrow its “biological
differences” jurisprudence while expanding the category of statutes
representing archaic and overbroad stereotypes. Feminist scholars have
proposed a number of means by which to reformulate these standards to
eliminate cases such as Nguyen in which the Court, even under its
narrowed “biological differences” jurisprudence, approved a
constitutionally questionable gender-based statute. One alternative could
be a version of Catherine MacKinnon’s “dominance approach” which
would ask whether a statute tended to facilitate women’s subordination to
men or alleviated it.250 If the latter, it would be regarded as representing a
“real difference,” the history of discrimination women have faced, and if
the former, an unacceptable stereotype.251
However, feminist scholars have also buttressed the Croson rationale by
accurately pointing out that the strict scrutiny standard not only protects
women from legislatures masking discriminatory statutes as benign, but
also protects women from discriminatory judges who may at once apply a
more lenient standard of intermediate scrutiny toward discriminatory
statutes.252 The Court’s decision in Nguyen, upholding a gender-based
statute written by a five male majority with then-both female justices
dissenting, confirms the real dangers of this claim.253 Admittedly, there is
no complete means by which to eliminate such a danger. However, four
considerations suggest the limitations of this argument. First, as discussed,
the price of this alleged safety would be the crippling of legislative action
as a means of remedying the history of gender discrimination in

248. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
250. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 40 (1987) (“In this
approach, an equality question is a question of the distribution of power.”).
251. See id. at 40-45. While MacKinnon presents a compelling argument for
abandoning the scrutiny analysis all together, our approach may present a compromise
means of incorporating their approaches without waiting for the unlikely abandonment
of the courts approach to gender and racial based statutes for over forty years.
252. See David L. Kirp et al., Gender Justice and Its Critics, 76 CALIF. L. REV.
1377, 1401 (1988) (citing Taub, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1686, 1691-92
(1980)) (“Moreover, Taub has suggested, and MacKinnon must recognize, that it is
exceedingly unlikely that a supposedly male-dominated court system can successfully
apply MacKinnon’s suggested standard of review.”).
253. See supra notes 165-170 and accompanying text.
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employment. Second, there is no guarantee that judges may not formulate
new legal theorems, which would incorporate the discrimination employed
through the utilization of intermediate scrutiny. Third, as noted by
feminists,254 if the law inherently represents male norms, a safety in
equality under these male norms may not be safety at all. Fourth, the
increasing presence of women in the law and the judiciary provides hope
that this danger may be slowly alleviated.
As stated, perhaps
optimistically, by Martha Fineman:
[F]eminists are no longer dependent on the Frankfurters of the world for
the translation of our ideas. Women now occupy professorships, are
members of the bar, and make up almost half of all law school classes.
A few of us are even legislators and judges. While full integration of the
professorship is far from complete (especially at the most powerful
levels), feminist voices can at least give our own voices to our ideas.255

Finally, the Croson court suggested that intermediate scrutiny would be
unable to distinguish those statutes, which, even though allegedly
supported by benign purposes, were unnecessary as a result of the
elimination of the needs requiring the particular remediation initiative in
the first place or which at their core were not based on the differential
characteristic.256 As to the first, the Court’s decision in Hogan suggests the
contrary. In the context of a nursing school, where women dominated the
field, the Court recognized the distinct lack of necessity for a statute
preferring female applicants.257 Admittedly, a closer case involving a field
where women were equally represented may require closer scrutiny by the
Court of the statutes’ legislative history. In addition, lower courts that
applied intermediate scrutiny after Croson have also required a
demonstrated disparity in the employment field.258 As to the second, the
Court demonstrated an ability in Orr to reject a gender-based distinction
where a narrower program aimed specifically at the problem, in that case,
insolvency, would have sufficed.259
Though the Croson majority framed its argument as legal, there is reason
to think that its arguments belied skepticism of the need for affirmative
254. See e.g., Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State:
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 658 (1983) (indicating that this
pervasiveness of male domination makes the application of rules impossible, for when
the state “is most ruthlessly neutral, it will be most male; when it is most sex blind, it
will be most blind to the sex of the standard being applied”).
255. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 39 (1995) (citations omitted).
256. See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 57-61, 107- 08 and accompanying text.
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action and the effect of a history of discrimination in general. Whereas a
full scale examination of opportunities available to women in society and
any resulting disparity is well beyond the scope of this paper, evidence
gathered by the federal government suggests that women are
underrepresented, specifically in leadership positions in a variety of fields
and that this disparity is the result of a history of intentional exclusion.260
2. The Stigma Communicated by Subjecting Gender-Based Affirmative
Action Programs to Intermediate Scrutiny Would Be Offset Were the Court
to Adopt Increased Scrutiny for Non-Benign Gender-Based Statutes.
The argument that subjecting gender-based statutes to intermediate
scrutiny while subjecting racially differential statutes to strict scrutiny
disperses a larger societal message demeaning the value of women is not
only troubling to my argument, but also flawed as it depends upon a
particular societal framing of the issue. Rather, the use of intermediate
scrutiny in reviewing gender-based affirmative action programs might
suggest society’s greater commitment to alleviating its history of
discrimination against women, especially if combined with strict scrutiny
for non-remedial statutes.
As discussed, the limited argument presented by this paper is that
intermediate scrutiny should be used specifically to review gender-based
affirmative action programs. A split approach subjecting non-remedial
gender-based statutes to increased scrutiny finds support in some of the
Court’s jurisprudence and writings. The Croson court correctly observed
that once the Court determines that a statutory scheme serves a benign or
remedial purpose, its analysis becomes particularly deferential.261
However, in J.E.B. and Craig, the Court rejected statistical support,262 and
in the former, specifically rejected the jury preemption scheme despite the
convincing nature of the empirical data presented.263 Furthermore, the split
approach is supported by dicta in Justice Ginsburg’s VMI majority opinion.
While requiring that gender-based statutes normally satisfy an
“exceedingly persuasive justification,”264 she specifically exempted from
this scrutiny those statutes that compensate women “for particular
economic disabilities [they have] suffered” and to “promote equal
employment opportunit[ies].”265 Admittedly, dictum is normally of little
precedential consequence. However, that the words are of Justice
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 36-38, 153 and accompanying text.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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Ginsburg, who filed many of the cases establishing gender as a protected
class, including Frontiero, is of significance.266
3. Arguments Stressing the Inconsistency Between the Application of
Intermediate Scrutiny for Gender-Based Affirmative Action and Strict
Scrutiny for Similar Race-Based Statutes Assume the Correctness of
Croson.
An argument stressing the perceived inconsistency that would result
from the utilization of strict scrutiny in reviewing affirmative action
programs benefiting African-Americans, a minority that acted as an
impetus for the enactment of the Equal Protection Clause, and the use of
intermediate scrutiny for programs benefiting women, are flawed in that
they assume Croson was correctly decided.
The reality is that constitutional scholars criticize Croson as the case that
abandoned the original purpose behind the amendment. Fearing that
Croson would cause localities to abandon race-based remedial programs,
Laurence Tribe organized a “Constitutional Scholars’ Conference” to
create guidelines for local governments that would assist in the
development of standards for programs that would fulfill Croson’s
requirements.267 For Michael Rosenfeld, Croson was astonishing because
it provided a “stark contrast between the apparent simplicity and clarity of
the legal test that the Court embraced and that test’s inability to account
coherently for the complexities inherent in the controversy that it
purport[ed] to resolve.”268 Russell Galloway similarly responded: “Croson
stood the Equal Protection Clause on its head, converting it from a bulwark
of equality to a guarantee of inequality and holding, for the first time ever,
that governmental affirmative action programs containing remedial racial
classification as unconstitutional unless strict scrutiny is satisfied.”269
Kathleen Sullivan interpreted Croson as the Court’s response to a
perceived societal backlash against affirmative action by addressing the
dismay of displaced whites.270 However, it was paradoxically flawed to
consider white resentment in the judicial review of affirmative action
legislation while simultaneously ignoring black resentment of laws with
266. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
267. See Laurence H. Tribe, Joint Statement: Constitutional Scholars’ Statement on
Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 679, 711
(1989).
268. Michael Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive
Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1793 (1989).
269. See RUSSELL W. GALLOWAY, JUSTICE FOR ALL? THE RICH AND THE POOR IN
SUPREME COURT HISTORY, 1790-1990 177 (1991).
270. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.: The Backlash
Against Affirmative Action, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1609, 1622-23 (1990).
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racially disproportionate effects.271
CONCLUSION
The arguments for applying strict scrutiny to gender-based statutes are
certainly compelling. Feminist legal scholars have long criticized not only
the subtle attempts by legislatures to codify stereotypes about women’s
roles and capacities, but also the Court’s refusal to sniff out these adverse
motives. Adding insult to injury is the symbolic message communicated
by the application of reduced scrutiny to gender-based statutes when
compared to the strict scrutiny applied to similar race-based schemes.
While these arguments are compelling, they do not mandate that courts
adopt or legal scholars advocate for any means available to solve these
problems. Rather, legal scholars and courts should recognize the viability
of alternative means of solving these problems that would at once preserve
the viability of gender-based affirmative action programs. The alternative
would be to severely limit the power of legislatures to address over 200
years of gender-based discrimination in the United States, and as a result,
freeze the limited opportunities available to women in a variety of
employment fields.

271. See id. at 1623.
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